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Semantic deference allows for the meaning of a word w a speaker uses 
to be determined by the way other speakers would understand or use 
w. That semantic deference has some role to play in semantic content 
attributions is intuitive enough. Nevertheless, the exact conditions un-
der which semantic deference takes place are still open for discussion. 
A key issue that the article critically examines is Recanati’s requirement 
that deferential uses be grounded, that is, that deferential uses be linked 
to non-deferential uses (Recanati 1997; 2000). After distinguishing be-
tween semantic and epistemic deference, I submit that the only way to 
maintain the Groundedness Thesis for truly semantic deference is to al-
low deference to idealized future linguistic collectives. I conclude that 
this is too high a price to pay for Groundedness and I suggest that it 
should be rejected as a semantic thesis.
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1. Semantic deference and the “Groundedness Thesis”
Speakers defer semantically when the meaning of words and expres-
sions they use is determined by other speakers’ understanding of these 
words/expressions rather than by their own. Typically, when speakers 
do not master the semantic content associated with a word w they want 
to use, they defer to an external norm for the fi xation of the meaning 
of w. The deferential mechanism is meant to account for the important 
fact that speakers can express meaningful thoughts involving lexical 
items they have an incomplete or imperfect understanding of. They 
do this by relying on the lexical competence and knowledge of other 
speakers.
Semantic deference seems to be supported by fairly robust intu-
itions about truth-conditions. It makes content ascriptions possible 
independently of speakers’ lexical mastery and also represents the im-
plicit commitments which go along with the use of a public language. 
It is indeed very natural to attribute its standard meaning to a word w 
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a speaker S utters, even if S’s understanding of w is such that S would 
not be judged competent with w according to communal standards. If 
you overhear someone saying that ‘The White House is threatened with 
subpoena’, the most natural assumption is that the truth-conditions of 
this random speaker’s assertion do not so much depend on her private 
understanding of the term ‘subpoena’ as on the way legal experts would 
understand it. By default, you assume that the speaker defers seman-
tically to legal experts for the fi xation of the meaning of ‘subpoena’.1 
The fact that the speaker could misunderstand this technical expres-
sion does not make the truth-conditions of her utterance different from 
the truth-conditions the same sentence would have if it was uttered by 
you, or by a legal expert, in the same circumstances. Exactly like you 
or the legal expert, the casual speaker is entitled to mean subpoena 
by ‘subpoena’, in the double sense that she can not only aim at the rel-
evant technical notion but effectively summon it in her discourse. This 
remarkable feat is supposedly achieved through semantic deference.
As Marconi observes, semantic deference is “real enough”, and sim-
ply corresponds to the fact that “we do not regard ourselves as seman-
tic dictators, like Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty” (Marconi 1997: 90). 
As members of a linguistic community, speakers implicitly know that 
a lot more is going on about word meanings than what their limited 
perspective gives them access to. Language users are aware of the fact 
that meanings are not entirely up to them. Empirically, this is evidenced 
by speakers’ willingness to have their language use corrected. It is also 
attested by a tendency to hold speakers accountable for the meaning of 
words they use, without regard for what they have in mind when using 
them. If I say there are ‘courgettes’ in the fridge, I make a false assertion 
if there happen to be only cucumbers there, even though it is precisely 
these cucumbers I had in mind (I bought them and put them there, I just 
tend to get confused about the labels). I could argue all I want, I asserted 
that there were courgettes in the fridge, not cucumbers.
So, however speculative the notion might appear at fi rst sight, 
strong intuitions support the existence of a mechanism of semantic 
deference. These can be gathered both from the internal perspective 
of speakers and from the external perspective of hearers and other 
“content ascribers”. Speakers are disposed to be corrected about word 
meanings and, even more interestingly, are disposed to recognize that, 
by the mere fact of using certain words, they express semantic contents 
they might not have internalized. Accordingly, hearers or other exter-
nal observers standardly ascribe semantic content to words a speaker 
utters without regard for the possible idiosyncrasies in the speaker’s 
lexical-semantic representations.
Clearly, the theory of semantic deference meshes with the “anti-in-
dividualist revolution” (Bochner 2014) of the 1970s, whose deep lesson 
1 From here on, the formula “S defers to x for w” will be used as a shorthand for 
“S defers to x for the fi xation of the meaning of the word/expression w”.
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was that individual mental states do not always determine linguistic 
reference. Though Putnam does not use the term ‘deference’ in “The 
meaning of ‘meaning’” (1975), it is quite obvious that his famous point 
about the “division of linguistic labor” supports the idea of semantic 
deference. Like Putnam, you might be unable to tell the difference be-
tween elms and beeches, but the mere existence of the two labels ‘elm’ 
and ‘beech’ is evidence enough for you to suppose that two distinct tree 
concepts are involved, which more expert speakers master and are able 
to apply correctly. The same is true for ‘gold’, ‘molybdenum’ or even, 
as Putnam argued, for a perfectly common word like ‘water’, whose 
real extension-determining “meaning” H2O is best defi ned by chemists 
and thus reaches beyond the superfi cial understanding that ordinary 
speakers might have of the word independently of scientifi c knowl-
edge.2 Burge (1979) made a similar theoretical point about social kinds 
such as ‘sofa’ and ‘contract’: these terms’ meanings depend on the so-
cio-linguistic environment, not on the private conceptions of individual 
speakers. Burge’s “anti-individualism” also provides support for the 
idea of semantic deference. Generally, semantic deference fi ts in nicely 
within an externalist framework. Even better, it tends to strengthen 
such a framework by showing that ordinary speakers themselves are 
practical externalists. They seem indeed to go by the assumption that 
a great deal of semantic knowledge can be safely “outsourced”. In the 
division of linguistic labor we trust.
As appears from these considerations, semantic deference is tied 
analytically to the notions of knowledge and expertise. If speakers de-
fer in the fi rst place, it is because other speakers have a better grasp 
of the meaning of some terms and are experts at using them. Expert 
speakers provide standards of lexical competence. They are needed 
for the mechanism of semantic deference to work. This requirement is 
made explicit in Recanati’s formalization of the deferential mechanism. 
Recanati (1997) introduced a “deferential operator” which allows con-
struing “deferential concepts”3 in a way analogous to indexicals. The 
deferential operator “Rx( )” is a function that applies to a “public symbol 
σ” (the word which requires deference to take place) whose content is 
that of the concept possessed by a “cognitive agent x” (the expert) and 
yields a deferential concept “Rx(σ)” (the one available for the deferrer 
to use). In Kaplanian terms, the content of the deferential concept thus 
obtained is the same as the content of the non-deferential concept (the 
expert’s concept), but its character is different. The character of the 
deferential concept is metalinguistic. Informally, it is something like 
“whatever x means by σ”. So, when the random speaker uses the word 
2 This claim needs to be qualifi ed. For Putnam, it is ultimately water itself, 
the actual stuff, and not chemists, that determines the meaning of ‘water’. This 
important point will be discussed below.
3 The use of the term ‘concept’ by Recanati might be somewhat puzzling. As I 
take it, ‘concept’ here refers to the general meaning of a term as it is understood by a 
particular speaker, that is, the character this term has for the speaker.
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‘subpoena’, she implicitly points toward experts in the linguistic com-
munity and appeals to their semantic competence. For a deferential 
speaker, then, the character of the word ‘subpoena’ should be some-
thing like “whatever ‘subpoena’ means for the relevant expert”. But its 
content (i.e., its Kaplanian “intension”) is simply the content it has for 
the expert.
Experts are supposed to be part of the deferential speakers’ envi-
ronment. As such, they are part of the linguistic context of deferential 
utterances. The x variable in the formula can be taken to be a contribu-
tion of the context to the utterance content – hence the analogy with 
indexicals. Deferential cases are cases of “social indexicality” (Recanati 
2001). If there is nobody in the linguistic community to defer to, or if 
the “experts” themselves do not really understand what a term means, 
the deferential concept fails to acquire a determinate semantic content, 
very much like a demonstrative fails to refer in the absence of a dem-
onstrated object. This means that a deferential concept can have a defi -
nite character but no defi nite content or intension, if it appears that in 
fact no one is in a position to use the term non-deferentially. Woodfi eld 
(2000: 442) provides the example of members of a religious sect who 
believe that “Jesus Christ and John Lennon are *alpha-enlightened* 
beings”, in a situation where no one (not even the guru) is able to really 
understand the phrase ‘alpha-enlightened’. In this case, the deferential 
operator applies to ‘alpha-enlightened’, but the deferential mechanism 
fails to yield any determinate (truth-evaluable) content, because no 
genuine expert is ultimately available to provide an interpretation for 
‘alpha-enlightened’. This means that, in the actual world, there is no 
context that would endow the term with evaluable content. As a result, 
the assertion of the sect’s belief is semantically ill-formed and its truth-
conditions cannot be calculated. By contrast, a student who acquires 
from her teacher a belief that “Cicero’s prose is full of ‘synecdoches’” 
(Recanati 1997: 86) comes to entertain a functioning deferential con-
cept of ‘synecdoche’, whose content can be traced back to a real expert. 
Such a constraint on what counts as successful semantic deference 
constitutes what Recanati calls the “Groundedness Thesis”:
(Groundedness Thesis)
A deferential use is grounded only if someone at the other end of the def-
erential chain uses the expression in a non-deferential manner. (Recanati 
2000: 452)
Deferential uses, Recanati claims, are parasitic on non-deferential 
uses. This means that deference must stop at some point. If everybody 
uses a word deferentially, then there is no real content associated with 
the word. It remains empty, meaningless. The Groundedness requisite 
can then be used to set apart functioning deferential uses from cases in 
which everybody defers to an authoritative interpretation which is in 
fact nowhere to be found. The link between semantic deference and se-
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mantic expertise, together with the Groundedness Thesis (henceforth, 
GT) it leads to, constitutes the most natural account of the phenom-
enon under consideration, which I will refer to as the “standard ac-
count”. While I think the idea motivating the account is initially sound 
– because standards of lexical expertise do exist and can be identifi ed 
– it raises a number of problems. These problems, I argue, call for se-
vere revisions of the notion of Groundedness that end up making it 
unappealing.
2. Epistemic deference, semantic deference 
and collective grounding
The main problem of the standard account, Woodfi eld (2000) argues, 
is that it equates semantic deference with meaning borrowing from 
particular individuals. The application of the deferential operator to 
an expression σ seems indeed to allow the deferential speaker to “bor-
row” the meaning σ has for a particular expert (the one who happens 
to be related to the deferrer by a deferential chain). But what if the 
expert gets it wrong? And what if experts disagree among themselves? 
As Woodfi eld shows, this can lead to highly counter-intuitive misun-
derstandings between speakers of the same language, once several ex-
perts are involved in a deferential process. In the synecdoche example 
adapted from Recanati (1997), it is enough to imagine the following di-
alogue between Alf, the boy who picked up the word ‘synecdoche’ from 
his schoolteacher (the initial expert), and a linguist L (the new expert):
(i) Alf says: ‘Cicero’s prose is full of synecdoches.’
(ii) L replies: ‘No it is not. It’s true that his prose is full of fi gures of speech. 
But very few of them are synecdoches.’
(iii) Alf replies: ‘I accept what you say. Cicero’s prose is not full of synecdo-
ches.’
 (Woodfi eld 2000: 448)
Let’s assume, with Woodfi eld, that the teacher to whom Alf defers him-
self has an imperfect understanding of the concept of synecdoche: he 
uses the term to refer to metonymies (of which synecdoches normally 
form a sub-kind). If we take the deferential operator to allow Alf to 
borrow the schoolteacher’s concept, then, when he says that ‘Cicero’s 
prose is full of synecdoches’, Alf is in fact asserting that Cicero’s prose 
is full of metonymies, since the operator forces us to treat the teacher’s 
understanding of the term as providing the semantic content of the 
deferential concept. But, in that case, the expert linguist L, who mas-
ters the meaning of ‘synecdoche’ and challenges the student’s asser-
tion, would be in fact missing the point entirely. L is referring to syn-
ecdoches, whereas Alf, unbeknownst to himself, is referring to another 
notion that he borrowed from his teacher under the misleading label 
‘synecdoche’. Since they are not co-referring, Alf and L are just talking 
at cross-purposes. Things become even more troublesome if we consider 
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the possibility that Alf’s deferential pointer changed targets between (i) 
and (iii). If, after accepting L’s judgement, Alf immediately stops defer-
ring to the schoolteacher and starts deferring to L instead, then (i) and 
(iii) no longer stand in logical contradiction to one another, discursive 
appearances notwithstanding. At the level of propositional contents, 
the dialogue would indeed run as follows:
(i) Cicero’s prose is full of metonymies.
(ii) No it is not. It’s true that his prose is full of fi gures of speech.
But very few of them are synecdoches.
(iii) I accept what you say. Cicero’s prose is not full of synecdoches.
Obviously, this misrepresents the communicative exchange, as it runs 
against our strong intuition that Alf and L do mean the same thing all 
along when they use the term ‘synecdoche’ (assuming they are engaged 
in a cooperative linguistic exchange), even if they do not understand 
it the same way and even if Alf’s deferential attitude changes in the 
course of the exchange. Furthermore, it misrepresents the fact that 
Alf has apparently changed his mind about one and the same topic be-
tween (i) and (iii), namely, about synecdoches in Cicero’s prose. 
Fortunately, this problem can be overcome by drawing, with De 
Brabanter et al. (2005), a distinction between “semantic deference” and 
“epistemic deference”.4 Epistemic deference is about directly exploit-
ing others’ cognitive resources. We defer epistemically to other people 
when we assume that they have a better understanding of the reasons 
and evidence for making certain claims we make. An agent A1 who de-
fers epistemically to another agent A2 uses A2’s words and behavior as 
reasons to make certain claims and draw certain conclusions, without 
necessarily understanding the criteria and reasonings motivating A2’s 
claims and behavior. Epistemic deference is not a specifi cally linguistic 
phenomenon. As Rauti (2012: 326) points out, you may defer epistemi-
cally to a silent hunter in order to know which way to turn in a hunt 
for deer. Whether the hunter comments or not on the signs she spot-
ted is irrelevant to your ability to defer epistemically to her. You do 
it as long as you make your own a claim or a belief based on someone 
else’s knowledge or expertise, without thereby necessarily acquiring 
this agent’s knowledge or expertise.
Semantic deference, by contrast, is a specifi cally linguistic phenom-
enon. It concerns the fi xation of word meanings themselves, i.e., the 
fi xation of their stable semantic contribution. A speaker S1 may defer 
epistemically to another speaker S2 for the reasons to use a word in a 
4 In their taxonomic study, De Brabanter et al. (2005) clarify the distinction not 
only between semantic and epistemic deference, but also, within semantic deference, 
between default and deliberate deference. They also show that the problem of 
imperfect mastery must be considered separately, as it is not a necessary feature of 
deferential uses (one can deliberately defer to someone else’s use/understanding of a 
word even in the absence of imperfect mastery, say, for playful or ironic purposes). I 
refer the reader to their work for further clarifi cations.
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certain way. But it does not entail that S1 defers semantically to S2 for 
the very meaning of that word. As De Brabanter et al. (2005) show with 
their adaptation of Burge’s arthritis example, a patient can defer epis-
temically to her doctor concerning the applicability of the medical term 
‘arthritis’ to her condition. But she does not thereby defer semantically 
to this particular doctor for the fi xation of the meaning of the word 
‘arthritis’ itself. Even more, she cannot reasonably be expected to defer 
semantically to him.
Let’s imagine that she is correctly diagnosed with arthritis by her 
physician, but that it appears later that he actually has a poor under-
standing of the ailment and, though able to diagnose it correctly (be-
cause he is good at identifying its symptoms), is not a reliable theoreti-
cal guide to arthritis (he holds many false beliefs about the ailment). 
Would the patient be willing to admit she was deferring all along and 
in every regard to her doctor for the meaning of ‘arthritis’, say, each 
time she was talking to people about her condition? We have reasons 
to doubt it. Even if her doctor was her only source of information about 
arthritis, it does not seem to imply she meant everything her doctor 
means by ‘arthritis’ each time she used the term. What she meant to 
refer to was the ailment that is supposed to be described by modern 
medicine under the label ‘arthritis’. Consequently, it is more reason-
able to assume that the patient, by default, defers semantically to the 
community of medical experts, and only defers epistemically to her doc-
tor for practical purposes.
Coming back to the synecdoche example, it is easy to see that Alf 
and the expert linguist both defer semantically to the community of 
experts in rhetoric. They are defi nitely talking about the same thing: 
the semantic contribution of the word ‘synecdoche’ remains stable over 
the course of the dialogue. The difference between Alf’s use and the 
linguist’s use of ‘synecdoche’ is purely epistemic. Alf starts off deferring 
epistemically, fi rst to his teacher, then to the linguist. He takes their 
claims as reasons to form particular beliefs involving the ‘synecdoche’ 
concept. The linguist, here, does not defer epistemically to anyone. But 
it does not mean that she would never revise her understanding of ‘syn-
ecdoche’, e.g., in the light of new developments in the fi eld of rhetoric. 
She is still disposed to defer. So, if one accepts that default semantic 
deference consists precisely in this default disposition to defer, both 
Alf and the linguist defer semantically, by default, to the community 
of experts in rhetoric, which provides the ultimate norm regarding the 
correct use of the word ‘synecdoche’.5
5 To be fair, this move is already implicit in Recanati (1997: 85), since he also 
writes that “there is a public interpretation of ‘synecdoche’, on which experts in 
rhetorics converge”. What we have seen is that this confl icts with his other claim that 
“the symbol’s content, in this context, is the content which the symbol ‘synecdoche’ 
has for the teacher” (92) because the teacher, as an isolated expert, could very well 
be mistaken about the norm.
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Of course, epistemic deference may also have linguistic implica-
tions. If A1 uses A2’s words as a ground for epistemic deference, it may 
have an impact on the way A1 conceives of the meaning of some of A2’s 
words. If someone points out a tree to you and tells you ‘That’s an elm’, 
you may or not decide to defer epistemically to that person. If you do, 
you make that person’s claim your own and you can use it to tell some-
one else, pointing to the same tree, that ‘That’s an elm’, or even to tell 
anyone else later that ‘There was an elm there’. Obviously, this process 
might help you get a better grasp of the meaning of the word ‘elm’. 
Likewise, Burge’s Bert, the man who believes that arthritis can affect 
soft tissues as well as the joints (Bert believes that arthritis has lodged 
in his thigh), comes to a better understanding of the meaning of ‘ar-
thritis’ once he is “apprised of the fact that arthritis is an infl ammation 
of joints and cannot occur in the thigh” (Burge 1979: 198). Arguably, 
Bert may have come to this improved understanding of the meaning of 
‘arthritis’ by deferring epistemically to other people’s judgment involv-
ing the word ‘arthritis’, i.e., by making their claims his own without 
necessarily understanding the rationale behind them. So, in both cases 
(‘elm’ and ‘arthritis’), it appears that a process of epistemic deference 
can have consequences on the deferential agent’s lexical representa-
tions. But, as the discussion of the aforementioned examples is meant 
to show, it does not follow that epistemic deference has any role to play 
in the fi xation of word meanings themselves. From the point of view of 
semantic content attributions based on deferential uses, local process-
es of epistemic deference are an idle wheel. Only semantic-deferential 
uses are the legitimate objects of GT.
As Woodfi eld notes, it is true that real-life processes of deference 
may stop at particular experts, but it is not true that they have to. An 
expert A at the end of a deferential chain could always herself defer 
for some reason to other experts B and C, while B and C defer to A for 
different reasons (Woodfi eld takes the example of scientists working 
together on a disease). Even if A stops deferring to B and C, another 
expert D can always show up with new evidence and reconfi gure the 
deferential relations. It is then possible to imagine never-ending “cir-
cles of mutually deferring agents” (Woodfi eld 2000: 435). The result is 
that no one is in a position to use a given technical term in a completely 
non-deferential way, which contradicts GT.
This should not be a problem. Once semantic deference to the “fi rst 
expert at hand” (De Brabanter et al. 2005: 14) is abandoned and the 
distinction between epistemic and semantic deference is introduced, 
the idea of mutually deferential collectives starts to make a lot of sense. 
Real-life experts only provide partial and fallible ways to approach the 
meaning of a word. Laypeople defer to them epistemically, not seman-
tically. Likewise, experts may defer epistemically to one another in 
various ways, but the existence of ideal individual experts, worthy of 
full semantic deference, is highly implausible and maybe simply not 
required for semantic purposes.
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The conclusion of this section is that, if semantic-deferential uses 
have to be grounded, the only plausible “cognitive agents” for the defer-
ential operator to index are linguistic collectives made up of variously 
competent and mutually deferential speakers. This, it seems, follows 
naturally from the distinction between epistemic and semantic defer-
ence. Now, this requires making the notion of a linguistic collective 
precise and fi t to play the role of the “cognitive agent” demanded by 
the deferential operator. What, exactly, is the “collective” target of the 
deferential operator? Two options are open. The operator could be tar-
geting only the best experts of the fi eld. Even if none of them individu-
ally possesses all the available knowledge, their combined knowledge 
might deliver the best possible defi nition of a term. Alternatively, the 
operator could be targeting something more abstract: a common body of 
knowledge, a set of norms or even a public language taken as a whole.6 
Perhaps the second option fi ts better with our intuition that common 
knowledge is more than the mere sum of individuals’ knowledge and 
is exempt from idiosyncrasies. Moreover, parts of it could even not be 
known by anybody but nevertheless available, stored in books or, as is 
increasingly the case, in computers.
To be sure, the notion of an abstract linguistic standard is hard to 
pin down and might raise ontological questions.7 Committing to such a 
notion, however, seems to be a fi rst price to pay if one wants to main-
tain GT for truly semantic deference (as opposed to epistemic defer-
ence). Yet, as I am about to argue, even clarifying this notion would not 
get proponents of GT out of trouble. Indeed, in order to maintain GT, 
one must make sure that collectives in fact play the role of higher-order 
experts stabilizing meanings. So far, the discussion of ‘arthritis’ and 
‘synecdoche’ only shows that we are inclined to think that they should 
do so. Yet it does not mean that they do. As the next section purports 
to show, the strong ties between semantic deference and externalism 
indicate that they do not.
6 All these suggestions are found in De Brabanter et al. (2005): “[The] truth 
value [of an utterance of ‘I have arthritis’] is determined by appealing to the experts, 
and to the linguistic community more generally, regarding the question of what 
counts as ‘arthritis’” (4); “In English, the meaning of “arthritis” is established in 
connection with the common body of medical knowledge” (5); “[The arthritis patient] 
is deferring by default to the norms of the linguistic community” (9); “we will be 
using the variable x either for users of a language or for the language itself” (8).
7 As O’Madagain (2014) points out, in order for the conventional semantic 
value of a term to be determined by a group, groups must be susceptible of 
being attributed intentional states and concepts. However, the model of group 
semantics he offers, inspired by that of Lewis (1969) for conventions, only works 
for attributions of intentional states to groups that are the result of an explicit 
procedure (as is the defi nition of the term ‘meter’ by the International Bureau of 
Weights and Measurements). This account thus falls short of explaining how 
distributed knowledge could ground the semantics of terms whose meaning is not 
fully determined by explicit agreement.
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3. Deferring beyond current understanding: 
virtual grounding
The deep problem with the “standard account” of semantic deference, 
even in the amended version where abstract collectives replace individ-
uals, is that it rests on descriptivist assumptions. Saying that speakers 
defer to experts’ understanding of a term is tantamount to saying that 
speakers defer to the experts’ defi nition of that term. Once we accom-
plish the move to abstract linguistic standards, the underlying assump-
tion is that the community provides the most complete defi nition, while 
no individual expert speaker possesses all the relevant information. 
Yet, at least in the case of natural kind terms, descriptivism is usually 
held to be untenable, because questions about a term’s meaning can 
hardly be separated from questions about our epistemic access to the 
term’s denotata. Given our epistemic fallibility, the semantic import 
of natural-kind term is taken to reach beyond available descriptions 
of the denotata and, even, to be independent of them. What, indeed, if 
the experts collectively got some facts wrong concerning the referents 
of natural kind terms, so that no appeal to collective wisdom can com-
pensate for individuals’ shortcomings? Can collective misconceptions 
ground meanings in the desired sense? Even if collective conceptions 
are not entirely mistaken, they might simply fall short of providing the 
determinacy of meaning that we take natural kind terms to have. And 
how are we to deal with radical changes of conception that occur in the 
course of a term’s history (for example, the fact that fi re is now thought 
of as the effect of a chemical reaction and no longer as a fundamental 
element)? These sorts of questions lead, from the rather uncontrover-
sial observations that speakers defer and that there is division of lin-
guistic labor, to more radical claims about meaning externalism.
As Putnam famously argued, the fact that our conceptions of nat-
ural kinds change does not entail that the meaning of natural kind 
terms changes accordingly. His point was precisely that the meaning of 
natural kind terms depends on the external world itself, independently 
of anyone’s grasp of the corresponding referents, hence independently 
of available descriptions of those referents. As Liu (2002) highlights, 
Putnam’s thought experiments about natural kind terms and Twin-
Earth aim above all to establish the doctrine of physical externalism, 
according to which the meanings of natural kind terms are determined 
by objective natural boundaries, independently of the state of our col-
lective knowledge. “‘[M]eanings’ just ain’t in the head!” (Putnam 1975: 
227) implies that meanings are external to any head, society’s heads 
included. Even so-called experts do not determine meanings. At most, 
they only provide the best approximations of how meanings should 
be construed. Therefore, experts, even collectively, do not ultimately 
ground our use of natural kind terms like ‘elm’, ‘beech’, ‘water’ or ‘fi re’. 
Only nature does. In the face of this, it is fallacious to jump from Put-
nam’s “division of linguistic labor” to the standard account of semantic 
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deference in which experts ground meanings. It is, for example, falla-
cious to attribute to Putnam, as I did above, the view that chemists 
determine the meaning of ‘water’. Chemistry is at best the most re-
fi ned method to approach the nature of that which we call ‘water’, but 
the meaning of the word, according to Putnam, depends on the kind of 
substance water actually happens to be, without regard for our concep-
tions. Twin-Earth-style thought experiments thus imply a rejection of 
meaning descriptivism for natural-kind terms.
If these externalistic intuitions about meaning are correct, then 
the conditions under which GT can be maintained must be amended 
further. Speakers must be taken to defer semantically beyond current 
standards of expertise and understanding. What, in this case, are they 
deferring to? The intuition behind physical externalism seems to be 
that speakers must be taken to defer to “the world”, to nature itself 
and the substances it contains. Though it accounts for truth-condition-
al intuitions, this construal of semantic deference is a considerable 
departure from the original notion of deference and one might object 
that it does not deserve the label “deference” at all (De Brabanter and 
Leclercq, ms). However, I think that it is possible to help ourselves to 
Peirce’s conception of knowledge (Peirce 1878) in order to recast this 
“semantic deference to the world” in a way that preserves the socio-
linguistic nature of deference (speakers defer to other speakers) and 
the descriptivism underlying the reconstruction of the phenomenon. 
This can be done by allowing speakers to defer to idealized future col-
lectives of experts. According to this interpretation, the meaning of the 
words ‘fi re’ or ‘water’ is determined not by what current collectives of 
experts happen to agree on, but by what future collectives will discover 
about the “substances” in question.8 So, instead of a rather metaphori-
cal deference to the world, one can maintain the basic notion of defer-
ence to other speakers, except that these now are hypothetical future 
speakers that we take, by stipulation, to be “ideal” experts, in posses-
sion of an understanding/defi nition so perfect that it is as good as the 
world itself to determine the extension-determining meaning required 
by our truth-conditional intuitions (those motivating semantic defer-
ence in the fi rst place). This kind of counterfactual or virtual deference 
(deference to virtual ideal speakers) is a way of neutralizing the unde-
sirable consequences of the descriptivism underlying talk of semantics 
deference whilst maintaining the structure of the standard account as 
well as GT. Obviously, since “cognitive agent x” is now located in the 
future, the amended account leads to the introduction of a notable te-
leological dimension in Groundedness. Paraphrasing Peirce’s formula, 
one could summarize the account by claiming that the meaning of that 
which a word encodes does depend on the real fact that investigation 
8 The proposal is a form of “Temporal Externalism” in the sense of Jackman 
(2005), except that it is augmented by the necessary idealization of future collectives 
(see below).
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is destined to lead, at last, if continued long enough, to stabilizing that 
meaning.9
However, the Peircean solution only seems to apply to alleged nat-
ural-kind terms: a notion that is notoriously diffi cult to clarify. One 
might indeed object that words like ‘water’, ‘elm’, ‘fi re’ and ‘arthritis’ 
all designate “natural kinds” only in a very broad and unenlightening 
sense of the term. As to physical externalism, it faces the “Qua-prob-
lem” (Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 79): How can we know that speakers, 
upon naming samples of a given entity that we retrospectively inter-
pret with the categories of contemporary science (‘Water has a chemi-
cal formula’; ‘Elms form a genus’; ‘Fire is a chemical reaction’; etc.), 
actually converge on the implicit norm of the hidden nature affording 
the natural-kind interpretation? Whilst acknowledging the diffi culty, I 
will not engage in any epistemological discussion about the grounding 
of natural kind terms here. As I now will argue, the point on “deference 
beyond current standards” is much more general and does not crucially 
depend on the outcome of such a discussion. It can even be made by 
considering terms with a far more dubious epistemological status than 
alleged natural kinds.
Take polemical terms such as ‘justice’, ‘science’, ‘philosophy’, ‘de-
mocracy’. They pose a specifi c problem for the standard deferential 
account, because their meaning is still so heavily debated in the com-
munity of experts, without any consensus emerging, that they suffer, 
as they stand, from a lack of determinacy which threatens the propo-
sitionality of the sentences that contain them, hence the possibility for 
semantic deference to be grounded. Most philosophical and moral terms 
are essentially polemical. Concepts debated within the social sciences 
and linguistics are also often polemical. Just consider, to take but one 
example, the issue of the distinction between what counts as ‘semantic’ 
and what counts as ‘pragmatic’. The range of confl icting views avail-
able is such that it could be argued, by a purely external observer en-
dorsing the Groundedness principle, that these alleged terms of art are 
in fact deprived of meaning. I take it that a similar point could be made 
about the need to distinguish between ‘synecdoche’ and ‘metonymy’.
Yet, experts disagree precisely about what they take to be one and 
the same conceptual problem, which they represent by using the same 
expression. They consider that there should be only one version of the 
‘semantic/pragmatic’ distinction,10 or one clear-cut defi nition of ‘syn-
9 “‘Truth crushed to earth shall rise again’, and the opinion which would fi nally 
result from investigation does not depend on how anybody may actually think. But 
the reality of that which is real does depend on the real fact that investigation is 
destined to lead, at last, if continued long enough, to a belief in it.” (Peirce 1878: 274)
10 This claim is compatible with the facts that experts currently recognize that 
there are many theoretically sound ways of making the distinction. I think that this 
is due to our epistemic limitations. At the end of the day, the presumption behind 
the use of dichotomic scientifi c labels is that there should be a clean way to “draw 
the line”. If there isn’t, then the dichotomy should be abandoned or reformulated.
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ecdoche’, because these are supposed to capture something about the 
investigated objects themselves. In the same vein, many philosophers 
assume that there is something substantial to our intuitions about ‘mo-
rality’ and ‘justice’, or about the autonomy of the ‘political’, and engage 
in passionate discussions about these topics, whereas the very exis-
tence of valid objects of inquiry has not been settled yet (and, in these 
cases at least, cannot be settled simply by pointing at natural samples 
of the referents, as physical externalism would have it). We can have 
the intuition of the unicity of an object/topic and coin a term for it long 
before we know whether the intuition is justifi ed in the fi rst place. In 
such cases, a deferential attitude appears to be almost constitutive of, 
and built into, the use of the term.11 This means that there should be 
some kind of external linguistic standard to which speakers are tak-
en to defer by default. Given the currently polemical nature of these 
terms, the linguistic standard that speakers are gesturing toward only 
comes as a promise, as the possibility of a future agreement.
Let’s recapitulate. Whether we consider natural kind terms or po-
lemical terms, the point is basically the same: their semantic content is 
not plausibly stabilized – hence not grounded – by current collectives of 
experts. Yet we have the intuition they should be grounded for the sake 
of semantic content attributions. Therefore, GT has to be amended in 
the proposed way: by allowing default semantic deference to idealized 
future collective states. Deference to idealized future states of the com-
munity refl ects the situation in which, on the one hand, there is some 
implicit agreement that there should be a stable meaning behind a 
given term and, on the other hand, the community of experts is un-
able to ground it, either because the extension-determining meaning 
of the term depends on the hidden nature of its referent, which only a 
hypothetical perfect state of knowledge could fully reveal (natural-kind 
terms), or because its meaning depends on a hypothetical perfect coor-
dination between future experts (polemical terms).
This argument, I believe, works for all terms whose meanings have 
a teleological component. In our proposed Peircean construal, this con-
cerns natural-kind terms as well as polemical terms. Teleological terms 
refer to entities our understanding of which is always perfectible and 
which are used in a process of ever-growing knowledge (natural-kind 
terms) or ever-fi ner rational argumentation (polemical terms). Follow-
11 Kaufmann (2006) explores the idea that “socio-political concepts” (expressed 
by terms like ‘nation’, ‘God’, ‘public opinion’) are constitutively deferential because 
they do not exist independently of the communicative chains through which users 
get acquainted with them. The way they are given is purely communicational. 
Ordinary agents gain access to them only by deferring to higher authorities (Church, 
political elites, social scientists) who also happen to use the terms deferentially. 
Experts defer to higher authorities or principles, which are only evidenced through 
language (writings, oral traditions, testimonies), and, crucially, never through the 
provision of an extra-linguistic referent. The deferential chain never stops: socio-
political concepts only have a reference “on credit”. As such, they blatantly violate 
the Groundedness principle in its original formulation.
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ing Jackman (2005), one may characterize (in the technical sense of 
character) the meaning of teleological terms as being sensitive to “epis-
temic” considerations. This means that changes in our conceptions of 
the meaning of these terms are brought about by epistemic factors: new 
discoveries or a better organization of our knowledge. Jackman con-
trasts “epistemic” with “pragmatic” explanations of linguistic change: 
“Pragmatic” theories explain change in terms of nonrational factors such as 
taboo, metaphor, semantic drift and the like. For instance, ‘zipper’ changes 
from being a brand name to a generic name for such mechanical fasten-
ers because the brand is so successful that users of the language gradually 
forget that the items of that kind are ever called anything else. We have a 
sociological/psychological explanation of the change, but no justifi cation in 
terms of the truth of the beliefs involved. By contrast, “epistemic” theories 
explain changes in usage in terms of factors such as the need to keep our be-
liefs consistent both with new experience and with each other. We stopped, 
say, applying the term ‘fi sh’ to whales because we discovered that whales 
were in many important respects closer to those creatures we called ‘mam-
mals’ than to other creatures we called ‘fi sh’. (Jackman 2005: 370)
In Jackman’s view, we take epistemically-driven changes to already 
affect what we mean with teleological terms, whether we can foresee 
these changes or not (and whether speakers explicitly acknowledge be-
ing “temporal externalists” or not). In the Peircean version of temporal 
externalism I claim proponents of GT are committed to, laypeople, indi-
vidual experts and currently existing linguistic collectives use teleologi-
cal terms deferentially. They all defer beyond the limited horizon of the 
community’s current epistemic state relative to the concepts at stake. 
They defer to a more advanced state of the debate, to an ideal state of 
the epistemic community in which a critical mass of interpretations 
would converge. What matters for semantic content ascriptions is not 
the actual criteria speakers use, but the fact that they are collectively 
engaged in using a term with the presumption that it corresponds to 
a valid concept. As a result, the ultimate semantic import of the term 
is more virtual than actual and calls for a notion of virtual semantic 
deference, i.e., deference to a potential or future normative agreement 
on the meaning of the term. Committing to such a notion, I suggest, is 
the price to pay if GT is to be maintained regarding deferential uses of 
teleological terms.12
12 Schroeter and Schroeter (2014) propose a “connectedness model” purporting 
to solve the question of the semantic content of “normative concepts” along very 
similar lines. Their model abandons the requirement of sameness of criteria and 
replaces it with a “tradition-based determination theory” of semantic values: the 
“entire representational tradition (i.e., the entire set of token thought elements 
bound together by relations of apparent de jure sameness)” (2014: 12) is taken as the 
default semantic value for the word/concept. Historically extended representational 
traditions encompass confl icting views and could therefore be taken as the 
default value of what I called “polemical concepts”. If representational traditions 
are extended in the past, it seems that they also point toward the future: future 
epistemic states of the community and future agreements between experts might 
solve the current lack of referential anchoring of some traditions.
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4. Too tough a bullet to bite?
I have argued that GT commits the theorist to far more than the exis-
tence of expert speakers, as long as the thesis is to apply to semantic 
deference and not merely to epistemic deference. Semantic deference 
concerns the ascription of truth-conditions to utterances. Given the im-
plicit externalism of our linguistic practice concerning certain terms, 
truth-conditions are world-involving and cannot be fully determined 
by mental states alone, even by the mental states of the most knowl-
edgeable speakers. Abstracting away from individual speakers towards 
the communal level fi ts better with what speakers take themselves to 
be doing, as the ‘arthritis’ example illustrates. Yet, upon closer scru-
tiny, deference to more abstract linguistic standards is not enough to 
vindicate our truth-conditional intuitions. As Jackman (2005) points 
out, changes in usage guided by epistemic factors (for example, the dis-
covery that whales are not fi shes) are normally not seen as changes 
of meaning, so that we also need to treat future “conceptual develop-
ments” as already affecting the meaning of terms we use. The fact that 
whales have been reclassifi ed as mammals at some point does not seem 
to entail that the meaning of ‘whale’ has changed. We have simply ac-
quired a better grasp of the properties that delineate the extension of 
the term, that is, a better grasp of the extension-determining meaning 
of the term.13 So, the intuition is that extension-determining meanings 
are already there, fully determined, despite the fact that we only very 
imperfectly apprehend them. Supposing the phenomenon of semantic 
deference is to retain its socio-linguistic dimension and be grounded at 
the same time, I have submitted that there is no other option for the 
deferentialist than to accept that we defer, implicitly and by default, to 
idealized future states of collective understanding.
Now, my fi nal claim is that the amended account of Groundedness I 
have just sketched is probably too committal. For one thing, it obvious-
ly rests on a very severe idealization. But, much more problematically, 
the account abusively attributes a foundational role to intuitions. This 
last problem, I think, is serious enough that it is preferable to reject GT 
altogether and reframe the issue in less demanding terms. 
It is one thing to recognize, as Jackman does (2005: 370), that, in 
the counterfactual situation where we could see into the future and 
discover an epistemically superior usage of one of our terms, we would 
be willing to change our own usage accordingly (thereby showing that 
we take ourselves to be same-meaning with future speakers). It is quite 
another to assume, as I have done for the sake of dramatization, that 
some metaphysical connection between our usage and a hypothetical 
future perfect understanding presently grounds the semantic import 
of teleological terms. Viewed in this light, virtual grounding is nothing 
13 Of course, other, non-denotational aspects of the “meaning” of the term, such 
as prototypical representations and stereotypes, may have changed as a consequence 
of the reclassifi cation. But these are not supposed to affect literal truth-conditions.
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more than “temporally loaded”14 Platonism. Yet I claim that this is pre-
cisely what GT inevitably leads to, if semantic deference is supposed to 
lead to non-deferential uses.
Perhaps one way to vindicate the intuitions motivating talk of se-
mantic deference whilst avoiding outlandish metaphysical claims is to 
reject Groundedness as a metaphysical thesis and recast it as a psy-
cholinguistic hypothesis. Put very briefl y, the rationale behind this 
move would be the following. The external world is essentially inscru-
table. Likewise, our relation to the external world is inscrutable. As a 
consequence, the extent to which the use of our terms follows precise 
epistemic norms (e.g., the norm of the “hidden nature”) is not known a 
priori, essentialist intuitions notwithstanding. Admitting that, it is not 
inconceivable that a great deal of our terms whose meaning is sensitive 
to epistemic considerations (“teleological terms”) are in fact semanti-
cally indeterminate: their boundaries evolve with our dealings with 
the world without being fi rmly settled. There is no reason to assume, 
just because we have realistic semantic intuitions, that nature itself or 
future speakers are systematically cooperating to fully determine the 
semantic import of the teleological terms we use. However, this does 
not prevent us from taking these terms to have determinate contents, 
exactly in the same way that we take ourselves to speak English and 
not just similar idiolects. It is a psycholinguistic fact that teleological 
terms appear to us to be endowed with substantive content and that, 
most of the time, a change of our understanding does not appear to 
us as a change of meaning. In fact, it is possible that we do not know 
whether the extension-determining meaning of a given term fully obeys 
“epistemic” rather than “pragmatic” considerations. Consequently, our 
commitment to the stable semantic import of teleological terms could 
be, at least in a signifi cant number of cases, the result of an illusion of 
the semantic kind.
Take the case of the word ‘whale’. Most likely, its extension-deter-
mining meaning has not changed over the last few centuries, because 
the term plausibly had the same extension in 18th century fi shers’ 
mouths as it has in ours. But let’s imagine a counterfactual situation 
in which ancient fi shers had come across some species of very large 
fi sh that looked very much like whales. I do not see any reason not 
to include this species in the extension of ‘whale’ in their English, if 
ancient fi shers would so call those large fi sh. This would not be in-
compatible with the fact that subsequent speakers, once they have dis-
covered better ways of classifying species, would perhaps say that ‘in 
fact those fi shes weren’t whales’ – precisely the kind of argument the 
temporal externalist appeals to. To be sure, speakers could opt for the 
exclusion of large fi sh from the extension of ‘whale’, thereby abiding 
by the scientifi c use. But it does not follow from this that whale-like 
fi sh were not in the extension of ‘whale’ before the discovery of the fact 
14 Jackman’s phrase.
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that most of the animals called ‘whales’ are mammals. The extension 
of the term has simply been changed. Therefore, the informal claim 
that whale-like fi sh were incorrectly called ‘whales’ is a retrospective se-
mantic illusion. In this scenario, whale-like fi sh just were in the exten-
sion of ‘whale’. They simply no longer are. Alternatively, in the same 
counterfactual situation, speakers might just refuse to follow epistemic 
considerations and keep using the word ‘whale’ as they used to (i.e., as 
a term referring to both whales and whale-like fi sh), leaving to biolo-
gists the coinage of other terms for the purpose of precise classifi cation. 
In this second scenario, whale-like fi sh unproblematically were and 
remained in the extension of ‘whale’. In fact, something very similar 
happened in the actual world for the term ‘reptile’. Scientifi cally, this 
term is no longer deemed to coincide with a consistent natural kind. In 
ordinary language, birds do not count as ‘reptiles’, whereas crocodiles, 
turtles, snakes and lizards do. In cladistic terms, this does not make 
much sense, for crocodiles are phylogenetically closer to birds than to 
the other ‘reptiles’. In spite of this discovery, ‘reptile’ has remained a 
perfectly serviceable English word and its extension has remained the 
prescientifi c one. Theoretically, its use could have been extended to in-
clude birds, and one could have said that ‘in fact, birds are reptiles 
too’, but that is not how usage has evolved. Instead, there is still an 
ordinary use for ‘reptile’ (probably motivated by the superfi cial proper-
ties so-called reptiles share, which provide useful contrast with birds, 
mammals and amphibians, that is, motivated by “pragmatic” factors) 
and no well-founded scientifi c use.
I take it that such examples are easy to multiply, showing that exter-
nalist intuitions about the “true scientifi c extension” of a natural-kind 
term suffer from what one might call a “scientifi c-essentialist” bias. My 
point is not that usage is never sensitive to essentialist considerations. 
It is rather that, even if ordinary usage does end up following scientifi c 
norms, it is only a retrospective illusion that the term “always had” the 
extension-determining meaning and the extension that we now take 
it to have. A less committal thesis would be that such illusions and 
other objectivistic intuitions about word meanings are compatible with 
the de facto semantic indeterminacy of a number of teleological terms 
and the open-ended nature of the semantic deference attached to them. 
The intuitions on which talk of deference and groundedness is based 
may have an important psychological role to play and are probably in-
dispensable to the project of knowing the world and communicating 
about this knowledge. However, by themselves, these intuitions are not 
enough to ground semantic deference, except if one is disposed to em-
brace a form of teleological Platonism. Unless one is willing to bite that 
bullet, I take it that GT should be rejected.
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5. Conclusion
Once linguistic deference is taken to determine semantic content prop-
er, it forces us to go beyond the level of concrete interactions, or even 
chains of interactions, between speakers and to consider more abstract 
linguistic standards that serve as guiding principles for our semantic 
content ascriptions. More precisely, only virtual semantic deference to 
future idealized linguistic collectives seems to be able to secure the in-
tended semantic import for our teleological terms. Barring the explicit 
endorsement of a form of Platonism, such an account is too committal 
and is better recast as a psychological hypothesis.
My focus has been mainly on prototypical examples of semantic def-
erence: deference for terms like ‘elm’, ‘water’, ‘arthritis’ and ‘synecdo-
che’, all amenable to scientifi c enquiry. I also addressed the category 
of polemical terms, which motivates the introduction of the more in-
clusive category of teleological terms: terms pointing at some “reali-
ties” (not necessarily physical) which might never be fully known but 
to which speakers nonetheless take themselves to be referring through 
words. I take the category of teleological terms to encompass all the 
terms whose meaning is sensitive to epistemic considerations: natural 
kind terms, scientifi c terms, polemical terms.
Teleological terms provide prime illustrations of semantic defer-
ence, because examples involving our epistemic limitations are the ones 
that come to mind most easily. A question worth exploring, though, 
is whether speakers can defer semantically for words whose meaning 
does not fi t nicely in the expertise-based model that underlies the dis-
cussion here. Besides teleological words, there is a vast grey area of 
relatively imprecise words, which are nevertheless easily grasped by 
speakers because of their familiarity. For most of these perfectly ordi-
nary items, it is not clear that it is possible to identify a community of 
experts, nor a teleological dimension attached to them. Are there spe-
cialized bodies within the English-speaking community who stabilize 
the lexical meaning of the words ‘meeting’, ‘sadness’, ‘soft’ or ‘friend’? 
Is the linguistic community engaged in the pursuit of a better under-
standing of the semantic import of these terms? Most likely not. More-
over, it is arguably part of the very functions of ordinary non-technical 
words to remain semantically underdetermined, in order to provide 
very abstract and fl exible frames for the pragmatics of everyday com-
munication to fi ll in.
Yet these words intuitively express distinct and graspable notions. 
Even though they are non-technical, vague and extremely context-
sensitive, they are not obscurely indeterminate in the sense esoteric 
concepts are. So, it seems that someone who does not understand an 
ordinary word like ‘friend’ (a small child, typically, or a foreigner), 
could defer semantically to other speakers for such a term. Would this 
kind of deference be constrained by GT? What would it mean to say 
that another speaker uses the word ‘friend’ non-deferentially? Since 
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the general concept of ‘friend’ is semantically underdetermined, it can 
be used with divergent semantic imports by equally competent speak-
ers. Does it mean that each non-deferential speaker grounds ‘friend’ in 
their own fashion, so that the concept is “multiply grounded”? This is 
an interesting possibility, but it runs counter to our understanding of 
the implicit motivations of the deferential speaker. Someone who de-
fers semantically for the meaning of ‘friend’ does not want to wind up 
expressing any old speaker’s idiosyncratic take on the word. The def-
erential speaker, by default, aims at the standard, collective concept. 
But what is the collective concept of ‘friend’ and how is it grounded? It 
does not seem to be a teleological term, because its use is more sensi-
tive to pragmatic rather than epistemic considerations. Knowing that 
future speakers will use the term differently would not be a reason for 
us to consider that our current use of ‘friend’ is mistaken in any way. 
And yet, what if future psychology converted words like ‘friend’, ‘love’, 
‘trust’ or ‘doubt’ into full-blown natural-kind terms, so that semantic 
appropriateness of past uses could be reevaluated with respect to new 
scientifi c fi ndings? 
These refl ections are, of course, purely speculative, but the fact that 
they make sense hints at the positive side of Section 4’s conclusion. If, 
on the one hand, it is possible that many of our teleological terms are 
semantically indeterminate, it is also possible, on the other hand, that 
some apparently non-teleological terms are more determinate than we 
anticipate, because they could also end up falling under epistemic con-
siderations. In a sense, the whole project of the “special sciences” (soci-
ology, psychology, anthropology…) is to unveil the “hidden” social and 
psychological functions of a host of ordinary terms, i.e. to uncover their 
externalistic semantics. The fact that the terminology of the special 
sciences is “contaminated” by ordinary language and always runs the 
risk of being semantically indeterminate is just a particularly dramat-
ic case of the general risk of semantic indeterminacy affecting all our 
terms, natural-kind terms included. Once GT is rejected as a semantic 
thesis, strict boundaries between kinds of terms are no longer needed. 
The pervasiveness of semantic deference and its psychological impor-
tance can be fully acknowledged without us committing to a problem-
atic metaphysics of meaning.*
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